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 The Effect of Corporate Tax 
Avoidance on the Level of Corporate 
Cash Holdings: Evidence from 
Indonesian Public Listed Companies  
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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance to the corporate cash holdings. 
Recent tax avoidance research found that tax avoidance is able to facilitate managerial rent 
extraction in the form of transfer of resources owned by the company. This study attempts to test 
how the relationship of tax avoidance with the amount of cash held by the company. The sample 
consists of 46 non-financial, non-property, non-real estate and non-construction companies from 
2009-2016, with a total 368 observations. The study uses two different cash holdings measures to 
test the robustness of the research results. This study cannot find evidence that tax avoidance 
have a significant relationship to the level of cash holdings in public companies in Indonesia. 
Both measurements of cash holdings gave the same conclusions to the results of the study. This 
study provides an insight that agency theory in the context of tax avoidance and corporate cash 
holdings in developing countries such as Indonesia needs to be explored further as the agency 
conflict in Indonesia as a developing country is more principal-principal conflicts.3 
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1. Introduction  
Tax avoidance within a company is all activities done by a company that results in a reduction of 
corporate taxes (Dyreng et al. 2008). OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) describes that tax avoidance is a taxpayer’s effort to reduce tax payable, even 
though this attempt may not be in violation of the law, but in fact it is contrary to the purpose of 
tax legislation. For the reason of tax avoidance is an act that is not against the law, it is then 
utilised by all taxpayers including corporate taxpayers, that as a human is rational and 
opportunistic, to minimise tax expenses. Moreover, big companies that are go public are more 
focused on the interests of shareholders than they have to pay taxes. While it is argued that tax 
avoidance practices can make tax paid by the company to be smaller, and hence it will maximise 
shareholder value (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), this practice can be harmful as it increases the 
tax risk of the company.  
Most recent literature found that traditional theory of tax avoidance arguing that tax 
avoidance as value maximisation for shareholders is not empirically proven (Santana and 
Rezende 2016; Chen et al. 2014). More corporate managers are found not to act as good agents 
because they can take advantage from tax avoidance activities for their personal gains. These tax 
avoidance practices which were originally regarded as a value-adding tool for shareholders 
provide an opportunity for managers as the control holder of the company to take the company’s 
resources through various attempts in long periods (Kim et al. 2010). If it is associated with the 
company’s cash holdings, it will be highly correlated, since cash is a very liquid asset type so 
that it will be very easily converted by managers for personal gains (Myers & Rajan 1998). This 
is found by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) that there is a negative relationship between corporate tax 
avoidance activities and level of cash owned by the company.  
Basically, from the side of the company, there are three motives of cash holdings 
(Keynes 1936) which are speculative motive, transaction motive, and precautionary motive. In 
this case, in regards to the results of research Dhaliwal et al. (2011), the amount of company’s 
cash holdings could endanger the activities of the company and the interests of the owners of the 
company due to potential cash transferred by agent of the company’s: manager. Having this 
background, the purpose of this study is to examine how is the effect of tax avoidance on the 
level of cash held by public companies in the case study of Indonesia. Following Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011), this study examines the relationship between tax avoidance and corporate cash level in 
the context of a developing country i.e. Indonesia. This study extends the previous study in 
Indonesia conducted by Melinda (2013) that found a non-significant relationship between tax 
avoidance with the level of corporate cash holdings. Compared to the current study, the study of 
Melinda is only based on one period (cross section) data analysis. This current study is based on 
more sophisticated panel data collected from periods of 2009-2016. Moreover, this study tests 
the resilience of the literature in the case of the robustness of the results as it uses two proxies of 
cash holdings which are mostly used by previous studies. Following the introduction, literature 
review will be discussed in the next section. Research methodology then is presented followed 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Agency Theory and Tax Avoidance 
In the context of modern corporations, where there is separation between agent (management) 
and principals (owners), it is argued that the agent does not always act and perform its duties in 
the best interests of owners. Due to the asymmetric information between agent and principals, 
tax avoidance activities, in this case, can be used as a tool to facilitate the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers which at the end increasing costs borne by the owners (Dhaliwal et al. 
2011). 
Tax avoidance as part of tax planning can be differentiated from tax evasion, that in 
contrast to tax evasion, tax avoidance is conducted without violating the prevailing laws and 
regulations. Nevertheless, tax avoidance is such controversial activities as while a company as a 
taxpayer may have right to reduce the tax burden in accordance with the law, but such action is 
deliberately arranged and planned to minimise tax payable which at the end can be defined as 
illegal acts as conflicting with the law spirit (Avi-Yonah 2008; Prebble and Prebble 2010). The 
tax avoidance behavior undertaken by a firm provides marginal benefits and marginal costs 
(Chen et al. 2010). Companies should be careful in analysing and considering every action taken, 
including tax management through tax avoidance.  
The benefits that can be obtained by the company through tax avoidance are a 
significant tax savings of which can be transferred to owners of the company. With the action of 
tax savings, the tax burden paid becomes smaller so that the net income of the company becomes 
larger. Managers can also get benefit from the tax avoidance activities which is a higher 
compensation or bonus since they are perform well minimising the tax burden paid by the 
company, thus benefiting the owners of companies with greater profit as well. nevertheless, 
managers can do rent extraction too. This is an action which the managers undertake to prioritise 
and maximise his personal interests, not the interests of the company owners. Measures taken by 
managers such as the preparation of aggressive financial statements, transactions with privileged 
parties, or taking resources or assets of the company to meet personal interests (Chen et al., 
2010). 
While providing marginal benefits, tax avoidance behaviour has some costs that may be 
borne by the company. The company may get tax penalties imposed on tax fraud, and may affect 
the fall in stock prices if its known to the public (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). According to 
Frank et al. (2009), when the fraudulent taxation of the company is found by the examination and 
taken through unlawful means, the company must get sanction from the tax authorities. At the 
end, the company bears other costs such as reputational costs and political costs (Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009). The company's falling reputation and decreasing stock prices are caused by 
investors’ negative perceptions of the company, as it indicates the existence of a rent extraction 
action by corporate managers that can harms shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala 2006).  
 
2.2 Tax Avoidance and Cash Holdings  
In contrast to the traditional theory that argues tax avoidance finally benefits the owners of the 
company, in the context of agency theory, it is clear that tax avoidance is an opportunistic 
behaviour of managers that benefits their own. To cover this opportunistic behaviour, managers 
attempts to limit some firm specific information (Kim et al. 2010). This exacerbates the 
asymmetric information between agent and owners which then causes company’s asset 
transferred to the agent (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). In this regards, the most liquid asset namely cash 




is predicted to be the assets that mostly transferred or wasted by the agent, as argued by Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) that while tax savings due to tax avoidance may benefit companies by increasing the 
cash flows, this condition may be inverted as tax avoidance facilitate managers to do more 
opportunistic behaviours and therefore cause more harm to the owner of the company. 
 
Based on discussion above, the hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
 
H1: Tax avoidance affects negatively to company’s cash holdings 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Overview   
Triggered by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) which found that tax avoidance is able to facilitate managers 
in transferring resources i.e. company’s cash, this research attempts to answer how is the 
influence of tax avoidance to the level of cash holdings in public companies. This research takes 
Indonesia as a background of the study as it is interesting to find evidence from one of 
developing countries which currently the regime applied tax amnesty. Since tax avoidance 
requires more confidential information and found as a tool for managers to perform managerial 
extraction and the nature of cash which is a very liquid asset and very easy to be converted by 
managers, this research attempts to examine the effect of tax avoidance on cash held by 
companies in public companies of Indonesia. Having longer research horizon, this study 
contributes to literature of tax and corporate finance as so far there is only one similar study 
found in Indonesia which is only based on limited cross-section data. 
 
3.2 Research Method  
This research is a quantitative study using secondary data which is collected from company’s 
audited financial statements. The sample is all public companies in Indonesia listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange with some exceptions to certain sectors due to different tax 
regulations such as application of final tax i.e. property, real estate, and construction sectors. 
This study also excludes more regulated industry i.e. financial companies. The design of this 
research is data panel analysis with periods from 2009-2016. Table 1 depicts the sample 
selection. 
  




Table 1. Sample Selection Method 
Number Criteria Number of 
Companies 
1. Companies registered in BEI period 2009-2016 540 
2. Companies that belong to the financial sector (92) 
3. Companies belonging to the property, real estate, 
and construction sectors 
(61) 
4. Companies that do not have complete audited 
Annual Financial Statement data 
(114) 
5. Companies that have experienced pre-tax loss 
during 2009-2016 
(175) 
6 Companies that are undergoing tax refund during 
2009-2016 
(26) 
7. Companies with Cash Effective Tax Rate 
(CETR) values > 1 
(26) 
Number of Samples 46 
Number of Observations 368 
 
3.2 Data Analysis  
This study adopts the model of Dhaliwal et al. (2011) which was originally developed by Opler 
et al. (1999): 
  
CHENAi, t = α0 + β1 TAXAVOIDi,t + β2 GRTHi,t + β3 SIZE i,t + β4 NWC i,t  
                               + β5 CAPEX i,t  + β6 LEVi,t + β8 DIVPAY i,t + β9 CFO i,t + εi,t 
where: 
TAXAVOIDi,t = Tax avoidance, measured by Cash ETR calculated by cash tax 
payment divided by profit before tax of company i in year t. 
CHENAi,t  =  Cash holdings, measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets (total assets minus 
cash and cash equivalents) firm i in year t; for robustness test, 
CHETA which is ratio of cash and cash equivalents divided by total 
assets of firm i in year t will be used. 
GRTHi,t   =  Growth of a company, measured by book value of debt plus market 
value of equity divided by total assets of firm i in year t 
SIZEi,t =  Size of a company, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
of firm i in year t 
NWCi,t   =  Net working capital, measured by net of cash and cash equivalents 
divided by net asset of company i in year t. 
CAPEXi,t =  Investment of a company, measured by capital expenditure divided 
by net asset of company i in year t. 
LEVi,t   =  Leverage, measured by total debt divided by total assets of firm i in 
year t. 




DIVPAYi,t =  Dividend policy, measured by a dummy variable score of 1 if the 
company distributes a dividend score of 0 otherwise. 
CFOi,t   =  Cash flows of a company, measured by cash flows from operating 




4.1 Outlier Test 
Based on Table 2 below, it can be seen that all data variables have a value of p-value <0.05, it 
means data is not normally distributed, therefore the data needs to be winsorized.  
 
Table 2. Shapiro-Wilk Test Results 
Variables Observation W    V   z  Prob>z 
 CHENA 368 0.73867   66.775 9.958  0.00000 
CHETA 368 0.89379 27.139 7.824 0.00000 
TAXAVOID 368 0.88300 29.895 8.053 0.00000 
GRTH 368 0.78675 54.489 9.476 0.00000 
SIZE 368 0.50854 125.578 11.455 0.00000 
NWC 368 0.98364 4.181 3.391 0.00035 
CAPEX 368 0.9215 20.059 7.108 0.00000 
LEV 368 0.94805 13.275 6.129 0.00000 
DIVDUMMY 368 0.97109 7.388 4.74 0.00000 
OCF 368 0.78564 54.773 9.488 0.00000 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (after Winsorization) 
Variables Observation  Mean  Std. Dev.   Min     Max 
 CHENA 368 0.1850624 0.1820081 0.008029 0.9561303 
CHETA 368 0.1399056 0.108164 0.007965 0.4887866 
TAXAVOID 368 0.3164299 0.1671257 0.05713 0.9668318 
GRTH 368 2.091398 1.429452 0.630335 8.781985 
SIZE 368 17700000.00 35400000.00 135849.50 214000000.00 
NWC 368 0.1286213 0.187847 -0.279723 0.5414513 
CAPEX 368 -0.0746092 0.0529155 -0.233458 -0.005586 
LEV 368 0.202198 0.1456816 0.001577 0.5972779 
DIVDUMMY 368 0.8722826 0.3342293 0 1 
OCF 368 0.1262191 0.0778975 -0.0130001 0.4202932 
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Table 3. shows descriptive statistics of this study. Cash holdings is proxied by CHENA (the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets, where net assets 
represent total assets minus cash and cash equivalents) and CHETA (cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets). The figure of CHENA shows that on average the companies have cash totaling 
18.51% of net assets (with no cash and cash equivalents). A company that has the smallest 
CHENA ratio is PT. Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food Tbk which is 0.8% while the highest is PT Bukit 
Asam (Persero) Tbk with 96%. The figure of CHETA is 14% of total assets owned. The 
company with the smallest CHETA ratio is PT Arwana Citramulia Tbk which is 0.8% while the 
largest CHETA ratio is PT Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk with a value of 49%. Then the average rate 
of tax avoidance of the sample company is 32%, with range 0% to 100%, it can be considered 
that the level of tax avoidance of companies is quite high in Indonesia.  
A growth opportunity denoted by GRTH is 209.13% meaning that the sample companies 
in this study have a high growth opportunity because the value has already exceeded 100% 
which means the sample company has a market value greater than its asset value which is based 
on book value. Companies with the lowest growth opportunity value are PT Colorpak Indonesia 
Tbk, PT Ekadharma International Tbk, PT Gema Grahasarana Tbk, PT Jakarta International 
Hotels & Development Tbk, PT KMI Wire and Cable Tbk and PT Multi Indocitra Tbk with a 
value of 63.03%. Then the companies with the highest growth opportunity value are PT Surya 
Citra Media Tbk, PT Kalbe Farma Tbk, PT Ace Hardware Indonesia Tbk, PT Adaro Energy 
Tbk, and PT Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk, with the value of 878.19%. The size of the company 
denoted by SIZE having average is Rp 17.7 trillion, with the lowest value of Rp 135.8 billion is 
PT Pyridam Farma Tbk while the largest is PT Astra International Tbk with total assets of Rp 
214 trillion. Net working capital denoted by NWC shows that on average 13% of non-cash 
current assets can be used as a source of liquidation by the sample company in the short term. In 
regards to the average of net asset which is Rp15.3 trillion, it can be known that Rp 1.9 trillion of 
net working capital can be converted into cash in the near term. Then the smallest net working 
capital value is -28%; this happens because there is a sample company whose total liabilities 
smoothly exceeds the total current assets, which is PT Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk while the largest 
net working capital value is 54.14% owned by PT MultiIndocitra Tbk.  
Capital expenditure denoted by CAPEX shows that on average capital expenditure of the 
sample companies is -7.4%. This figure shows that the sale of the company’s fixed assets is 
greater than the amount of its fixed asset purchase. The minimum value of the capital 
expenditure is -23.3% owned by PT Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa Tbk means the company sold 23.3% 
of its fixed assets from net assets. On the other hand, the maximum value of capital expenditure 
is -0.5% owned by PT Trikomsel Oke Tbk. Then, leverage denoted by LEV shows that on 
average leverage of the sample company is 20.2%; this indicates that the sample company has 
20.2% leverage to its total assets. With the average total assets of the sample companies of Rp 
17.7 trillion, the average leverage of the sample companies in rupiah is Rp 35.7 trillion. The 
lowest LEV value is owned by PT Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk of 0.15% while the highest LEV is 
PT Trikomsel Oke Tbk which is 60%. 
Dividend payment denoted by DIVDUMMY shows that on average only 87.2% of the 
sample companies pay dividends. It also shows that during the research periods most companies 
make dividend payments during the study period. The other control variable which is cash flow 
of the operating activities denoted by OCF shows that on average cash flow from the company's 
sample operation activity is 13%. This figure means that with average net assets of Rp 15.3 
trillion, the average total cash flows from operating activities in rupiah currency units amounted 




to Rp 1.9 trillion. The minimum value of OCF variable is  owned by PT Kalbe Farma Tbk (-
1.3%) while the maximum value is 42% owned by PT Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk. 
 
4.3 Selection of Panel Data Model 
This research is based on panel data where the determination of the model is done through three 
stages. The first test is Chow test to determine whether the model is Pooled Least Square (PLS) 
model or Fixed Effect (FE). The next test is Breusch-Pagan Test Lagrangian Multiplier (BPLM) 
to determine whether the model is PLS model or Random Effect (RE). The final test is Hausman 
test to determine whether the data fit for FE or RE models. Based on the tests, the best model is 
random effect (for proxy CHENA) while for the robustness model (using proxy CHETA) is a 
fixed effect model. 
 
4.4 Classical Assumption Test Results 
Table 4. Results of Multicollinearity Test  
Variables  VIF  1/VIF   
SIZE 23.06 0.043367 
DIVDUMMY 8.99 0.111280 
OCF 4.61 0.216940 
TAXAVOID 4.58 0.218307 
GRTH 4.52 0.22110 
CAPEX 3.69 0.271361 
LEV 3.60 0.27750 
NWC 1.70 0.587926 
Mean VIF 6.84   
 
This study uses a linear regression which must qualify Best Linear Unbiased Estmates 
(BLUE). Three stages of testing from the classical assumption were conducted which are 
multicolinearity test, heterokedastisity test, and autocorrelation test. Table 4 shows that the 
average value of VIF is 6.84 which means less than 10. Hence, the assumption of 
multicollinearity is not violated by the variables.  
The second BLUE test which is heterocedasticity test applies only to PLS and Fixed 
Effect panel data models whereas the Random Effect model of this assumption is not violated 
because the test will use Generalized Least Square (GLS). Therefore, the heterocedasticity test 
was conducted only for the second model, robustness model using CHETA. The result shows 
that chi2 (46) = 2732.81 and Prob>chi2 = 0.0000. As the value of Prob>chi2 less than 0.05, the 
second model has heterocedasticity problem. 
The last classical BLUE assumption requirement is an autocorrelation which ensures that 
observation data have no time-to-moment relationship. Wooldridge test was conducted to 
ascertain whether the model has an autocorrelation problem. The basis for determining the 
violation of this assumption is seen from Prob> F if the value is lower than 0.05 then there is a 
violation of this assumption. This test was conducted only on the second model because the 
assumption is still the same, that is the first model using Random Effect autocorrelation 
assumption is also not violated due to using GLS. The results of this assumption test are F(1,      
45) = 21.893 and Prob > F = 0.0000 meaning that for the second model has an autocorrelation 
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problem. The second model, however, is regressed with DriscollKraay standard errors Fixed 
Effect to solve the autocorrelation problem. 
 
4.5 Simultaneous Effect Test (F-test) and (Chi2-test) 
Table 5 shows that for the first model using a random effect the Chi2 value equals to 0.0000 
which is less than p-value 0.05; this means that independent variables together are 
simultaneously able to influence variable dependent. Similar to the first model, the second 
research model that uses fixed effect also gives the value Prob> F for 0.0000 as shown in Table 
6. 
The first model using random effect has R-Squared 0.2856 meaning that 28.5% of the 
independent variables can explain cash holdings of a company while the second model using 
fixed effect shows R-Squared much higher which is 0.3276 meaning that 33% independent 
variables can explain cash holdings of a company. 
 
 
4.6 Analysis of Hypothesis Testing Results  
Table 5. Regression Test Results First Model with Random Effect 
CHENA Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
TAXAVOID -0.1168356 0.19907 -0.59 0.557 -0.5069959 0.27332 
GRTH -0.0133226 0.03381 -0.39 0.694 -0.0795839 0.05294 
SIZE 0.0606593 0.04911 1.24 0.217 -0.0355897 0.15691 
NWC -1.39055 0.32971 -4.22 ***0.000 -2.036775 -0.7443 
CAPEX -0.156941 0.67638 -0.23 0.817 -1.482622 1.16874 
LEV -3.100857 0.41585 -7.46 ***0.000 -3.915901 -2.2858 
DIVDUMMY 0.0397748 0.10984 0.36 0.717 -0.175512 0.25506 
OCF 3.155909 0.48635 6.49 ***0.000 2.202674 4.10914 
_CONS -2.661119 0.77865 -3.42 0.001 -4.187242 -1.135 
Number of 
Obs. 368 
Description: CHENA = natural logarithm of the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents to net assets in which net 
assets represent total assets minus cash and cash 
equivalents; CHETA = cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets; TAXAVOID = measured by using a Cash 
Effective Tax Rate wherein the cash in taxes divided by 
profit before tax; GRTH = using Tobin's Q ratio; SIZE = 
natural logarithm of total assets; NWC = Ratio of net 
working capital with net assets; CAPEX = ratio of capital 
expenditures to net assets; LEV = ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets; DIVDUMMY = is a dummy variable of 
dividend payment "1" if it pays "0" otherwise; OCF = 
cash flow ratio from operating activities to net assets. 
Signs *, **, *** signify significance at successive levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
  
Wald chi2(8) 145.07 








Table 5 shows further that tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) has a coefficient and p-value of -
0.1168 and 0.557 respectively meaning not significant to cash holdings. The table also presents 
that many control variables are not significant to cash holding policy of a company, which are 
growth opportunities (GRTH) with p-value of 0.694, firm size (SIZE) with p-value value of 
0.217, capital expenditure (CAPEX) with p-value of 0.817, and dividend payment 
(DIVDUMMY) with p-value of 0.717.  
Control variables which are significant explaining the cash holdings policy are explained 
as follows. Net working capital (NWC) has a coefficient and p-value of -1.39055 and 0.000 
(significant at 1% level) respectively. Hence, it can be said that net working capital variable has a 
significant negative effect to the company’s cash holdings, proxied by CHENA. Then, leverage 
(LEV) has a coefficient and p-value equals to -3.100857 and 0.000 (significant at level 1%). 
Finally, the cash flow from operating activities (OCF) shows a coefficient and p-value value of 
3.155909 and 0.000 respectively bringing a conclusion that cash flow from operating activities 
has a significant positive relationship.  
Table 6 below shows a similar conclusion to the first model for the relationship between 
tax avoidance and cash holdings policy as the results is insignificant. Some control variables are 
also not significant, which are growth opportunities (GRTH), firm size (SIZE), capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), and dividend payout (DIVDUMMY). 
 
Table 6. Second Regression Model Results  
(with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors Fixed Effect) 
 
     
 
 
CHETA Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
TAXAVOID -0.0131882 0.01766 -0.75 0.479 -0.054945 0.0285687 
GRTH -0.005053 0.00269 -1.88 0.103 -0.011419 0.001314 
SIZE -0.009275 0.00316 -2.94 **0.022 -0.016736 -0.0018144 
NWC -0.112636 0.04005 -2.81 **0.026 -0.20733 -0.0179419 
CAPEX -0.059343 0.05836 -1.02 0.343 -0.197338 0.0786515 
LEV -0.308229 0.02339 -13.18 ***0.000 -0.363535 -0.2529222 
DIVDUMMY 0.0014259 0.00638 0.22 0.830 -0.01367 0.016522 
OCF 0.3769583 0.0461 8.18 ***0.000 0.267958 0.4859587 
_CONS 0.3202667 0.06506 4.92 0.002 0.1664141 0.4741194 
Number of 
Obs. 368 
Description: CHENA = natural logarithm of the ratio of 
cash and cash equivalents to net assets in which net assets 
represent total assets minus cash and cash equivalents; 
CHETA = cash and cash equivalents to total assets; 
TAXAVOID = measured by using a Cash Effective Tax 
Rate wherein the cash in taxes divided by profit before tax; 
GRTH = using Tobin's Q ratio; SIZE = natural logarithm 
of total assets; NWC = Ratio of net working capital with 
net assets; CAPEX = ratio of capital expenditures to net 
assets; LEV = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
DIVDUMMY = is a dummy variable of dividend payment 
"1" if it pays "0" otherwise; OCF = cash flow ratio from 
F(  8,     7)    837.74 
Prob > F   0. 0000 
R-squared  0.3276 




The other control variables are significant namely net working capital (NWC), leverage 
(LEV) and cash flow from operating (OCF). Net working capital is significant (at alpha 5% 
level) with a coefficient of -0.112636 meaning that every 1% increase in the net working capital 
variable will decrease the company’s cash holdings by 11.26%. Then, leverage (LEV) has a 
coefficient and p-value value of -0.308229 and 0.000 (significant at alpha 1%) respectively. 
Operating cash flows is also significant with a coefficient of 0.000.  
 
5. Discussion 
Due to tax avoidance allegedly able to facilitate managers to transfer resources of the company, 
this research attempted to answer how tax avoidance affects ownership of cash of public 
company in Indonesia. Based on the results above, it is concluded that the findings of the study 
are similar to Melinda (2013) that in the context of Indonesia there is no evidence that tax 
avoidance activities influence cash holdings of a company. The corporate policy of cash holdings 
can be explained only by control variables of net working capital, leverage and operating cash 
flows. As the study found non-significant growth value to cash holdings, the result is consistent 
with the anecdote that firms with small growth opportunities have more cash than firms with 
high growth opportunities because they are overseen by investors. The other controlling 
variables namely capital expenditure, growth, size and dividend policy of a company are neither 
able to explain the amount of cash held by the company.  
This study which cannot find the effect of tax avoidance on the level of cash of the 
company provides an insight that agency theory in the context of tax avoidance and corporate 
cash holdings in developing countries such as Indonesia needs to be explored further as the 
agency conflict in Indonesia as a developing country is different to developed countries. Found 
by Claessens et al. (2000), the agency conflict in Indonesia is more principal-principal conflicts, 
not principal-agent conflicts. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between the amount of cash 
held by a company and tax avoidance. Based on eight-year research horizon with 368 
observations collected from Indonesian public companies, nevertheless, this study is unable to 
find this relationship. The findings of this study still cannot find evidence that tax avoidance has 
a significant effect on the level of firm cash holdings in Indonesian public companies, as found 
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(within)  operating activities to net assets. Signs *, **, *** signify 
significance at successive levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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